Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

A GRAIN OF PRUDENCE

By ARTHUR W. ALLEN

THE pacifist seems to share with other reformers an instinctive difficulty in distinguishing between what ought to be, as he sees it, and what under existing conditions it is reasonable to hope for, with the necessary result that his activity is not infrequently an ineffective beating of the air, because what he urges as capable of early realization is believed by those outside of his own limited cult to be beyond the bounds of present possibility—the dream of an enthusiast, to be realized some time—perhaps.

To use a somewhat extreme illustration, those who advocate disarmament for the United States, or the non-fortification of the Panama Canal, on the theory that if we were unarmed no one would attack us, may be correct—though that theory manifestly assumes also that our smaller neighbors would be equally safe, or at least that we should, in a military sense, leave them to their fate—but to urge it as a policy to be adopted here and now is clearly a waste of effort. It is impossible to get a hearing.

If the peace movement were without faith and did not look forward and upward, it would not exist; but that is not to say that we should never look to our footsteps—that our eyes should always be on the distant mountain tops, without thought of immediate possibilities for good or of imminent pitfalls and obstructions.

One hesitates to criticize adversely the work of devoted men and women who are giving their time and thought to the work and to whom it is a species of religion, especially in view of the fact that it is so nearly impossible to present a concrete workable plan for immediate effective action, but in truth what is said here is not adverse criticism. It suggests only that the pacifist keep clearly in mind the distinction between preaching great principles and planning for present results. Every clergyman whose heart is right preaches every doctrine that Christ taught as the standard by which to live, but in making a program for active work for the week or for the year he does not assume that his parishioners will fully live up to the doctrine of non-resistance, or that the rich among them will sell their goods and give them to the poor, or that any program he may formulate will effect that result.

So the various programs, more or less complicated, that have been evolved for the welding of the nations, ranging from complete federation to the new plan of the "League to Enforce Peace," are in greater or less degree academic, having their place as theories of what might be, and worthy of study by those having time and academic interest; but they are not, as a whole, applicable, from any human point of view, at the present stage of international development. Even the loose program of the "League to Enforce Peace," though it has high sanction, seems, on analysis, practically unworkable. It may almost be said that when a sufficient number of nations have enough in common to warrant their entrance into such a league the need for it will almost have passed; though this, after all, is not strictly true, for we have learned, as individuals, in community and nation, that though we may be in agreement as to what is just between man and man, the restraint of the law is often needed to keep our conduct in line with our conscious sense of justice.

It seems to me that the great problem of the movement for international comity, on which alone permanent international peace can be founded, is to find the motive that will cause the nations to sink the exaggerated ego now possessing them all in greater or less degree and to develop in them the germ at least of an international conscience, thereby substituting a sense of justice and mutual obligation for the present arrogant spirit of dominance by might, with the least possible regard for the reasonable claims of other nations or for the common good.

The world is somewhat disposed to sneer at the idea of an international conscience, and there is no question of the difficulty of arousing it; but since out of the chaos that once existed in the relations between man and man we have evolved something that may fairly be called a conscience, governing individuals, we need not despair of a similar outcome in the national and international sense.

Motives are always mixed, and it is impossible to determine to what extent this evolution in the case of the individual—his willingness to surrender some part of his complete freedom of action for the general good—has been the outcome of his innate sense of justice and to what extent it has arisen from motives of self-interest. It is easy to say that men saw that the old system of mutual antagonism was unprofitable for all, and that each individual welcomed the change, because it was better for him; but there is in us all a sense of right and wrong, however dormant, and it is more probable that mingled with the selfish point of view was the sense of gratification that the new system was right, and that whatever the result to him individually, the community at large was the gainer.

So it must be with nations, if the international machinery is ever to run smoothly. With the desire for individual good must run some passion, however feeble, for the general welfare, else the desire for immediate so-called benefit will always overshadow the more distant possible share in the common good.

I am not of those who believe that the mere machinery of international law will suffice to produce the much desired result. In so far as it is the outcome of the desire for right and justice, as just defined, it will stand the test of daily use, because there is behind it the will that it shall stand, but it cannot be unduly forced; and it is not too much to say that while Europe maintains its present point of view regarding armament, whether it is at war or at peace, the full flower of happy international relations and the resultant international law will never be realized, because the very existence of such armament is proof positive that international friendship is only a superficial and passing incident; that antagonism is the ruling force, and that war is only a question of days, months, or years.

What is the moral of all this? What can be done to help matters now or at the close of the war? Who knows what the conditions will be when the war is over? Are all the programs now being evolved worth the time and energy that is being given to their preparation? Can practical steps of probable ultimate value be taken under present conditions?

The one active question now within the range of vision is that of the increase of American armament, and that must be handled with gloves. The country shows every sign of having made up its mind to the need of increased military preparation, and the utmost that any opponent can hope to accomplish is to prevent its reaching extravagant proportions by convincing, if he can, that less will suffice. It will be to no purpose to employ the usual peace society method of attacking the whole plan and trying to shave the program down. There is this time to be met not a professional military demand, but the earnest sincere faith of the people that more defense is needed, and glittering generalities as to the immunity of America will not serve. Its opponents will need, too, to avoid complications with partisans of the present belligerent nations, working in the interest of one nation or another, under whatever guise. Whatever action is taken—for or against increased armament—must be the free expression of Americans, working in the interest of America, and America only.

Aside from this question of our own present need for armament, immediate practical problems seem just now to be almost non-existent. We shall have them in abundance when the war is over, no doubt; but what they will then be is today on the knees of the gods, and today our chief mission is to stand fast by our fundamental principles, mark time, and wait. When the war is over the whole subject may present a totally new aspect. There may, for one thing, be fewer kings and kinglets to settle out of hand the destinies of their peoples.

PEACE BY FORCE AND FEDERATION

By JAMES L. TRYON

THE most significant change in the American peace movement during the last year is the tendency of some of its most representative leaders to base it upon force. This is shown by the organization of the League to Enforce Peace. The scheme of William Ladd, the founder of the American Peace Society, provided for a court and congress of nations without sheriff or policeman. The great majority of the advocates of peace in the nineteenth century and even up to the present time have consciously or unconsciously followed in his footsteps. An arbitration tribunal, reference to which should be voluntary, or at most morally obligatory when pledged by treaty, the decisions of the court to be accepted in good faith by the litigants, was the plan of the Hague conferences as of the Interparliamentary Union. Advocates of the Court of Arbitral Justice, the most advanced ideal of an international court for questions arising in time of peace that has ever been officially approved by the nations, have usually urged an international judiciary without police and have considered Mr. Root's address on public opinion as the sanction of international law the best expression of their views on this subject.* So the convention for the International Prize Court, a court of appeal in prize cases, arising in war, with a previously chosen personel, somewhat similar to that of the Court of Arbitral Justice, and like it, projected at The Hague in 1907, depended upon the good faith of the litigants for the enforcement of decisions. Further, the cases that were tried in the nineteenth and at the opening of the twentieth century required no international coercion for the enforcement of decrees. The very fact that the society of nations hitherto has been a recognized collection of free and independent states, all upon an equality, utterly intolerant of the idea of an overlordship, each state virtually a law unto itself, especially if it were a great military or naval state, and exceedingly jealous of its rights if a small state, made an atmosphere for arbitration. Arbitration is peculiarly a method for the adjudication of cases between states that theoretically are equals which generally choose their own judges and agree beforehand either expressly or impliedly to accept the award to be rendered.

But if voluntary and non-enforcible arbitration is appropriate to a loose relationship of independent states, a court with enforcement powers is suited to a union of only partially independent states when pure independence is sacrificed to interdependence in order to secure stability and protection under federal sovereignty. We should not expect to introduce the sanction of force without a corresponding advance in federation to make force, when collectively used, effective. That we have been making slow, almost imperceptible, progress towards world federation there can be no doubt, and that we are becoming confronted with the problems of federation is a situation that is difficult for some of us to realize. This evolution towards world federation, now in the stage of quasi-confederation, may be traced in the development of the administrative unions, of which the postal union may be taken as an example, the Hague court, upon which we are advancing, the Hague Conferences, the third of which is to be supplied with an order of parliamentary procedure, and the solution of international problems by conferences of groups of the powers over questions in China, Morocco, the Balkans, and Mexico, which, though marked by failures in some particulars, set precedents for united action. The present alliances in Europe, though now antagonistic, may also be instanced as steps towards ultimate unity. In the juridical organization of the world, in which we have made greatest progress through independent arbitral tribunals and the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, we have progressed to a point where if the

* See *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1908, p. 451.